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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Petitioner,

-v-

Case No. 20047

ROBERT PAUL PACHECO,

Defendant-Respondent.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
PETITION FOR REHEARING IN AN APPEAL FROM
CONVICTION OF BURGLARY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (1978), IN THE THIRD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE ERNEST
F. BALDWIN, JUDGE, PRESIDING.
DAVID L. WILKINSON

Attorney General
DAVID B.

THOMPSON

Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Petitioner

SUMNER J. HATCH
7 2 East 40 0 South, Suite 33 0
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorney for Respondent

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Pl ai nti ff-Petitioner,
-v-

Case No. 20047

ROBERT PAUL PACHECO,
Defendant-Respondent.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED IN PETITION FOR REHEARING
The following issues are presented in this petition for
rehearing:
1.
Franklin,

Did the Court misapply the holding of Francis y.
U.S. __ , 105 S. Ct. 1965 (1985), as analyzed and

applied in State y. Chambers, Utah, __ P.2d __ , Nos. 19151 and
19152 (filed October 21. 1985), to the jury instruction
concerning possession of recently stolen property that was given
in the instant case?
2.

Did the Court incorrectly hold that admission of

defendant's post-arrest explanation of his possession of a
recently stolen ring (i.e., "it may have been there from a
previous burglary") was prejudicial error because that evidence
was only relevant to show defendant's propensity to commit a
crime?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Robert Paul Pacheco, was charged with
burglary of a dwelling, a second degree felony, under UTAH CODE
ANN.

§

76-6-202 119781.

A jury found him guilty as charged.

The

court sentenced defendant to the Utah State Prison for a term of

one to fifteen years and fined him

ss,ooo.

STATC:·lENT Of___EACT_S
The State agrees witn the fact statement set forth in
the Court's opinion in State y, Pacheco, Utah, __ P.2d
20047,

slip op. at 1-2 (filed October 21, 19 85)

No.

<a copy of the

full opinion is contained in Appendix A), except for

that portior

relating to the content of the jury instruction concerning
possession of recently stolen property that was given at trial.
.I_d.

at 2-3.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

By failing to consider the entire jury instruction
regarding unsatisfactorily explained possession of recently
stolen property, as well as other jury instruction given,

the

Court misapplied Francis v. Franklin in holding that the
possession instruction was unconstitutional.
In holding that admission of evidence of defendant's
post-arrest statement explaining his possession of a stolen ring
was prejudicial error,

the Court failed to recognize the

relevancy of this evidence to the Jury's determination of the
guilt question and misapplied the relevant rule of evidence.
I clTRODUCT ION
In Brown y, Pickard, denying reh'g, 4 Utah 292, 11 P.
512

(1886),

this Court set forth the standard for determining

whether a petition for

rehearing should be granted:

To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be
made.
We must be con·:inced that the court
failed to consider some material
in the
case, or that it erred in its concl·Jsions, or
that some matter has been discovered which
was

unk;iown 3t

t:--ie

of
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the hear1:-:g.

4

at 294, 11 P.

cit 512 (citation omitted!.

In Cummings y,

lltl:2..QD, 42 lctilh 157, 129 P. 619 (19131, the Court stated:
To make an application for a rehearing is a
matter of right, and we have no desire to
discourage the practice of filing petitions
for rehearings in proper cases. When this
court, however, has considered and decided
all of the material questions involved in a
case, a rehearing should not be applied for,
unless we have misconstrued or overlooked ·
some material fact or facts, or have
overlooked some statute or decision which may
affect the result, or that we have based the
decision on some wrong principle of law, or
have either misapplied or overlooked
something which materially affects the result
If there are some reasons, however,
such as we have indicated above, or other
good reasons, a petition for a rehearing
should be promptly filed and, if it is
meritorious, its form will in no case be
scrutinized by this court.
42 Utah at 172-73, 129 P. at 624.

The argument portion of this

brief will demonstrate that, based on these standards, the
State's petition for

rehearing is properly before the Court and

should be granted.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT MISAPPLIED THE HOLDING OF FRANCIS
V. FRANKLIN, AS ANALYZED AND APPLIED IN S'.rh.l'..E
V. CHAMBERS, Itl DECIDING THAT THE JURY
INSTRUCTION CONCERNING POSSESSION OF RECENTLY
STOLEN PROPERTY, GIVEN IN THE INSTANT CASE,
WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
In State y,

Pacheco, Utah, __ P.2d __ ,No. 20047

(filed October 21, 19 851

(see Appendix Al,

this Court held that,

based upon its analysis and application of Francis y. Franklin,
__ U.S. __ , 105 s. Ct. 1965 (19851,
·;. 1'bar1oers,

in a companion

.'t3h, __ P.2d __ , Nos. 19151 and 19152 (filed

1
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. ·' [ .

FJc;i c lu
Court's dec1s1on

§

76-6-402(11

'N2.::

it:.s

(19781 ,1

some unexplained reason,

in its entirety.

_.;1·•-:",

someu11ng it t0i.:nd •._,be>

under Franklin in Chambers,
for

t:ic

slip op. cit 6-7.

flowe•;er,

the Cour:,

failed to consider the instruction

Instr•_iction No. 15 i:-i ·.ihole read:

The la'" of the state of Utah provides as
follows:
"Possession of properti·
recently stolen, when no satisfactory explanation of such
possession is made, shall be prima
facie evidence that the person in
possession stole the property."
Th·Js, if ;·ou find from the e•:idence and
beyond a reaso:-iable doubt, (l) that the
defendant ·,,,as i:-i ?OSSession of property, (Ill
that the property was stolen in a burglary,
l l l l ) tnat s;,ich oossession was not too remote
in point of time.from the burglary, and (IV)
that the defenda:-it had made no satisfactor;·
explanation of s:.ich possession, then you may
find from those facts that the defendant
committed the bu:glary in which such property
was st o 1 en and st o 1 e the pro pe r t y .
( R. 12 9) •

1:-i deciding whether that instruction is unconstitu-

tional under Frankl1n,

the Court must necessaril:/ consider hQ.tl;

paragraphs of the instr_iction, as well as other instructions
<;ii·; en to the , 'Jf'i.
1 Section . . E-6-4C2 1 1;

prc·:ijcs:

FcssessJ..'-!n c: propert:· rec'=nt-2-:: stolen,
when no
of
tx::.=:: ess::....:::-i 13 '."'."3Ce, s;:.ail
:=.:1'.Tla
f3c e e·J1Je:lcP
tne perscn i:-i t:ossess1on
sto
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aeneral

presented in

tnat presented in Chambers and Franklin:

is the same
Did the JUry

1•Ftr·Jcti•Jn "na·:e the effect of relieving the State of its burden
of

beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential

dem"nt of a crime."
omitted I.

Frankl1n, 105 S. Ct. at 1970 (c1tations

As stated in Franklin:
The analysis is straightforward. "The
threshold inquiry in ascertaining the
constitutional analysis applicable to this
kind of jury instruction is to determine the
nature of the presumption it describes."
l.Q., at 514, 99 s.ct., at 2454.
The court
must determine whether the challenged portion
of the instruction creates a mandatory
presumption, see 1._d., at 520-524, 99 S.Ct.,
at 2457-2459, or merely a permissive
inference, see Ulster Countv Court·;. Allen,
442 U.S. 140, 157-163, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 22242227, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979).
A mandatory
presumption instructs the jury that it must
infer the presumed fact if the State proves
certain predicate facts.
A permissive
inference suggests to the jury a possible
conclusion to be drawn if the State proves
predicate facts, but does not require the
jury to draw that conclusion.

A permissne inference does not relieve the
State of its burden of persuasion because it
still requires the State to convince the jury
that the suggested conclusion should be
inferred based on the predicate facts proven.
Such inferences do not necessarily implicate
the concerns of Sandstrom.
A permissive
inference violates the Due Process Clause
only if the suggested conclusion is not one
that reason and common sense justify 1n light
of the proven facts before the jury.
Count,· Court.
442 U.S., at 157-163, 99
S.Ct., at 2224-2227.
Analys1s must focus init1ally on the
specif :c
challenged. but the inquiry
dc.os ;)Ot nd there,
If a
i;xirtion of
the nc; charge, considered in isolation.
haVP been understood as
;:P3tin;i a pres4m.,c1on that relieves the
0

-s-

State of its burdPO of ocrsuasion Oll__illl
ele.'11ent of ao
20tential1'1
offending words must be
context of the charge as a whole.
instructions might explain the particular
infirm language to the extent that a
reasonable juror could not have considered
the charge to have created an unconstitutional presumgtbon.
C11pp y, Naughton, 414
U.S. 141, 147, 94 s.ct. 396, 400, 38 L.Ed.2d
368 (1973).
This analysis "requires careful
attention to the words actuallv si;x:iken to the
jury • . . , for whether a defendant has been
accorded his constitutional rights depends
upon the
in which a reasonable juror
could have interpreted the instruction.
442 U.S., at 514, 99 S.Ct.,
at 2545,.
105 S.Ct.

at 1971-72 (emphasis added).

When this analysis is

applied in assessing the validity of Instruction No. 15,

it

becomes clear that a reasonable juror could only have understood
that instruction to contain a valid permissive inference.
although the first paragraph of the instruction,
isolation,

First,

if considered i:,

could reasonably have been understood as creating a

presumption that relieves the State of its burden of persuasion
on the elements of burglary, when considered in the context of
the instruction as a whole,

a reasonable juror could not have

considered that paragraph to have created an unconstitutional
presumption.

The second paragraph, which clearly is stated in

the for:n of a permissive inference,

serves to explain the

statement of law in the first paragraph.

The words "shall be

deemed prima facie evidence" are not readily understandable to
the average juror, and,

in fact,

probably are not particularly

well understood by many lawyers, as is evidenced by the conf'JSic,
this Court has experienced with the phrase.
op. at 7-9.

Therefore, a reasonable Juror surelJ' would have reJ,
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the second paragraph which, significantly, begins with the word
n

t.hus,

n

as explaining the statement of law in the first

paragraph.
1)

No reasonable juror could have read Instruction No.

as requiring a finding that defendant was guilty of burglary

once he found beyond a reasonable doubt the enumerated predicate
facts.

Given the wording of the instruction and viewing it as a

1o1hole, a reasonable juror 1o1ould have understood that he
must,

not

find defendant guilty of burglary once satisfied that the

predicate facts had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.2

This

conclusion is further supported by examining other instructions
that 1o1ere given to the jury.

Instruction No. 3 read:

You are instructed that to the
Information the defendant has entered a plea
of not guilty.
The plea of not guilty denies
each and all of the essential allegations of
the charge contained in the Information and
casts upon the State the burden of proving
each and all of the essential allegations
thereof to your satisfaction and beyond a
reasonable doubt.
(R. 118).

Instruction No. 12 read in pertinent part:
All presumptions of law, independent of
evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a

2 That the instruction's first paragraph is a verbatim recitation
of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-402(1) (1978) does not automatically
render the instruction unconstitutional.
And, the use of the
term "prima facie" does not in itself require a finding that
there is Franklin/Sandstrom error.
slip op. at 7-8
(noting cases 1o1here this Court held that al though the use of the
term prima facie in an instruction 1o1as improper, it was not
prejudicial in light of other instructions given to the jury).
Instruction No. 15 does nothing more than instruct the jury on a
"traditional common-law inference deeply rooted in our law."
Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843 (1973).
State v. Sessions, 583 P.2d 44, 45-6 (Utah 1978); State v.
Kirkham, 20 Utah 2d 44, 432 P.2d 638 (1967) (cases implicitly
recognizing the validity of this common-law inference in the
context of approving its use in burglary cases).

-7-

defendant is presumed inn0cent until he is
proved guilty beyond a
doubt.
And
in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether
his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is
entitled to an acquittal.
( R. l 26l •

Instruction No. 16 read:
Before you can convict the defendant of
the crime of Burglary of a Dwelling as
charged in the Information on file in this
case you must believe from all of the
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each
and every one of the following elements of
that offense:
1. That on or about the 3rd day of
June, 1983, at 443 East Vine Street, Murray,
Utah the defendant, Robert Paul Pacheco,
entered or remained in the dwelling of Masaj i
and Tsuruko Imai; and
2.
That said defendant did so
unlawfully; and
3. That said defendant did so with the
intent to commit a theft.
If you are not convinced that the
evidence establishes each and all of the
essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt, it is your duty to find the
defendant not guilty.
If, on the other hand,
you are convinced of the truth of each and
every one of the foregoing elements beyond a
reasonable doubt then you must find the
defendant guilty of Burglary as charged by
the Inf orma ti on on file in this case.

<R. 130).

And,

perhaps of most significance, was Instruction Ne.

18, which stated:
If in these instructions anv rule,
direction or idea has been
in varying
ways, no emphasis thereon is intended, and
none must be inferred by you.
For that
reason, you are not to single out any certain
or an:,· 10d1'1idual .,aint or
instrl.:ct'on. and i;inore the others. but you
are

to cons1::1Pr

all tbP iostr·;c+-1<'DS 3.S a

wholP, and to regard
the others.

10 the li;bt of all

- 8-

The order in which the instructions are
gi'len has no si?nificance as to their
relative imrxirtance.
: R. l32J

''2.cnphasi s added).
Second,

Instruction No. 15 contains an acceptable

permissive inference given that "the suggested conclusion is.
one that reason and common sense justify in light of the proven
facts before the jury."

Franklin, 105 S.Ct. at 191.

The Supreme

Court made this clear in Barnes y. United States, 412 U.S. 837
(1973),

which held that an instruction on the common-law

i.nference of guilty knowledge from the unexplained possession of
recently stolen property satisfied the requirements of due
process.

l_d.

Kirkham

at 841-46.
at fn.

State v

Sessions; State v.

2)

Significantly, the Pacheco instructions do not have the
problems identified by the Court in the instructions it found to
be unconstitutional
of

§

in Chambers.

There, the verbatim recitation

76-6-40211) appeared alone, without the explanatory

paragraph included in Pacheco Instruction No. 15.
op. at 4.

Fn therrnore,

Chambers, slip

in Chambers a separate instruction

defined the term prima facie in such a way that it "could well
have indicated to a juror that the defendants were required to
disprove guil t"--a defect that could not be cured by another
instruction that restated the presumption in permissive form.
l_d.

at 6-7.
In

S'1:1,

Instruction No. 15 survives the
anal:,-sis.

and applied in C'.Jamt;Prs,

In applying Franklin, as analyzed

to the instant case, the Court failed to
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take into account the s1gnific3nt
at issue in
Consequently,

:J1fferenCFcS in the

and th<' instr,xtion addressed here.
the Court arri':ed at a conclusion that appears to

be contrary to the law expressed in franklin and Chambers.
POINT II
THE COURT INCORRECTLY HELD THAT THE ADMISSION
Of TESTIMONY CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S POST- ARREST EXPLANATION FOR HIS POSSESSION OF THE
STOLEN RING WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
Pacheco held that the trial court committed prejudicia:
error in allowing "Detecti'1e Anderson to testify during the
State's case in chief that defendant had stated in response to a
question regarding the origin of the ring,
there from a previous burglary.'"

'(I]t may have been

Slip op. at 3.

In arriving ac

this conclusion, the Court reasoned that, because the inference
set out in§ 76-6-402(1)

is addressed only to the trial court for

determining whether the State has established a prima facie case,
the post-arrest statement of defendant, who did not take the
stand at trial to offer an explanation for possession of the
ring,

should not have been presented to the jury.

Even without

that evidence "the trial Judge would have been Justified in
assuming that a prima facie case of burglary had been made out
against defendant."

Pacheco,

slip op. 4.

Therefore,

in the

Court's view, because the evidence of defendant's statement,
which included an admission of a prior crime, was "in no way
• relevant to prove a specific element of the crime of burglar;'"
and went only to show defendant's ;)[opensity to commit crime, ic:
admission was prejudicial error.
recognize

the

r-=2.·2':3nC'

c:

llll_d.

c;ia_:lenged
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This

fails to
to

tJrJve

s qull t anrl

J•c!

reflects a critical misapplication of the

rules of evidence.
First,

the trial court's determination of whether a

prima facie case has been established under§ 76-6-402(1) and the
jur/'s determination of the guilt question are two entirely
different functions.
defendant's statement,

Although the Court correctly concluded that
in light of his failure to offer any

explanation of his possession of the ring at trial, was not
necessary for satisfaction of the prima facie evidence standard
applied by the trial court,

it incorrectly concluded that the

evidence was not at all relevant to the issue of guilt presented
to the jury.

The Court's application of Chambers in this regard

strongly suggests that Jury consideration of unexplained or
Jnsatisfactorily explained possession of recently stolen
property, and the inference of guilt that may be drawn from that
circumstance, is improper.
established law.
119731 .3

Such a conclusion is contrary to

BarDPS y, United States, 412 U.S. 837

A Jury may lawfully and reasonably draw an inference of

JJcl cc frol'.1 ,xissession of recently stolen property when no
satisfactorf explanation of that possession is given.
"Possession of recently stolen property is nothing more than a
circumstantial bit of evidence in a case of burglary
SLltP

'!.

Kirls.han, 20 Utah 2d at 44, 432 P.2d at 638.

3 The error in this conclusion is fully discussed in the State's
petit1c" for rehearinj in S,..ate y. Chambers.
The State's
3r·ciur:'.ent there i:c incorp:Hated by reference here (see Appendix
Bl •
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Evid. 404(bl

!Supp. 1985)5 in h0lding that defendant's statemer.:

was inadmissible because it was not rele·:ant to prove a specift
element of burglary and was relevant only to show defendant's

s_e.s;: Pacheco, slip op. at 4.

propensity to commit a crime.
404(bl

R·'

provides:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.
Evidence
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith.
It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.

Like former Utah R.

E'lid. 55 (19771, Rule 404 (bl

is inclusiona:

"evidence of other crimes or civil wrongs that is competent and
relevant to prove some material
the general
y,

of the defPndant,

Tanner, 675 P. 2d 539, 545

.s..e..e_
1982),

other than to show merelj'

(Utah 1983)

is admissible."
(emphasis in origi nali .

i]nited States·:, Bradshaw, 690 F.2d 704, 708
463 l'.S. 1210

(9th Cir.

(1983).

4 Under this analysis, presentation by the State of evidence of
defendant's pretrial explanation for possession of recently
stolen property is not restricted to those cases where the
defendant takes the stand and offers a contrary explanation. A
defendaoit' s unsat1 sLictor:· explanation is most appropriately
presented as circ·Jmstantial evidence in the State's case-inchief.
412
at 839 Sessions, 583 P.2d at 44
(defendants' explanatory statements admitted in government's
case- in-chief l.
5 The c'..lrrent rules of evidence were in effect at the time of
defendant's trial.

The State offered defendant's statement only as
e'.'1dence of his guilt of burglary (i.e., as
e':ld>:'nce of a lack of le•:ial justification for possession of the
rinq and an inability to explain satisfactorily that possession),
Sessions, 583 P.2d at 45-6

<approving of an inference of

guilt from these circumstances in burglary cases); it was not
offered to show defendant's propensity to commit a crime (R. 40711; Appendix Cl.

Defendant voluntarily gave his explanation

about a prior burglary to the police officer after being arrested
and after receiving a Miranda warning

(R. 40-8; Appendix Cl.

As an initial matter, the evidence of other misconduct
contained in defendant's voluntary statement should not be viewed
as "extrinsic" evidence for

purposes of Rule 404 (b).

Because the

evidence of the prior burglary was inextricably intertwined with
the e'1idence used to prove the crime charged,

it was admissible.

United States y. Mccrary, 699 F.2d 1308, 1311

(11th Cir. 1983)

iin prosecution for aiding and abetting introduction of drugs in
federal prison,

evidence of other acts of dealing in drugs in

prison held "inextricably intertwined" with evidence used to
prove crime charged).
Weinstein's Evidence
'!.

generallv 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger,
404[10] at 77-9 <1985).

3lant:rn, 730 F.2d 1425, 1432 <11th Cir. 1984)

a.

United States

(evidence of

other wrongdoing at time of arrest of defendant not inadmissible
under Rule 404 1 b) because that evidence was "part of the
:if the offense"'.

E'1idence of defendant's explanation was

critical to the State's case; and,
reference t'c

2

.!..f.S

inclusion of defendant's

prior burglary was essential to the jury's

-13-

understanding of the c·x;::lanat10n and its assessment of whether
the explanation was satisfactory.
Even if Rule 404 (b)

is applicable,

properly admitted defendant's statement.
test must be met for

the trial court

Essentially, a two-st-

admission under that rule:

( ll

"the

evidence of an extrinsic offense must be relevant to an issue
other than the defendant's bad character, n and

( 2)

nits probat1·;,

value must not be substantially outweighed by undue prejudice tc
the defendant."
Cir. 1983)

[Jnited States y, Punch, 722 F.2d 146, 153

(citation omitted).

(5th

Defendant's statement obviousl1·

was relevant to show that he had no legal

justification for

possession of the ring and could not give a satisfactory
explanation for his possession of it.
was relevant to identity and intent.

Moreover,
In short,

the statement
the evidence

assisted the jury in understanding the cirs,;mstances,

and its

probative value was not outweighed by the possible prejudice to

.s.e.e.

defendant •

£..l.lru;,,h, 722 F.2d at 153.

In conclusion,

the following comment by Professor

Ronald Boyce on this part of the Pacheco opinion is particular!;
instructive:
[TJhe Court's ruling on the
admissibility of defendant's admission is
wrong in this writer's opinion.
The Court
confuses the value of the evidence as to the
State's burden to make out a prima facie case
with the State's burden to prove guilt to the
satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The question is whether the
defendant's admission has any relPyance to
prove his guilt, as distinct from merely
showing bad character.
The admission could
be interpreted by the Jury as showing
defendant had no legal Justification for
possession of the rirq and could not make a

-14-

reasonable
to why the ring was
in defendant s possession. This evidence,
although tlnnecessary to the determination of
a pr ima facie case by the trial judge, is
relevant to the jury's consideration of
guilt. Further, the Court is wrong in saying
before the evidence is admissible it must
"prove a specific element of the crime." The
evidence to be admissible under Rule SS,
U.R.E., 1971, or Rule 404(b), U.R.E., 1983,
need only have been relevant to any issue in
the case other than bad character. If theevidence was more prejudicial than relevant,
it should have been excluded under Rule 4S,
U.R.E., 1971, or Rule 403, U.R.E., 1983. By
tying the admissibility of the admission to
the issue of "prima facie" case for the trial
judge, the Supreme Court has created an
erroneous, restrictive, and misconceived
standard of admissibility that will come back
to haunt it. Any knowledgeable defense
counsel will use this case to argue that
evidence of other misconduct, unnecessary to
establishing the prosecution's prima facie
case, is inadmissible. This is not the
proper legal standard for admissibility of
such evidence.
Intermountain Commercial Record, Nov. 1, 198S, at 24, col. 1.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing discussion, it appears that
the Court in State v. Pacheco, misapprehended significant case
law in concluding that the jury instruction regarding
unsatisfactorily explained possession of recently stolen property
was unconstitutional.

Also, the Court applied a wrong principle

of law in holding that the trial court committed prejudicial
error when it admitted evidence of defendant's post-arrest
statement explaining his pcssession of a stolen ring.

Therefore,

the State's petition for rehearing should be granted and the
instant case should be restored to the calendar for reargument or
Ut2h R. App. P. 3S(c}

-15-

(198S).

Alternatively,

the Court should modify its opinion to reflect a p[ope[
application of Franklin v. Francis and Utah R. Ev id, 404 (b),
The State certifies that this petition is presented ir
good faith and not for purposes of
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

(:;

day of November, 1985.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

B.
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and exact copies of the
foregoing Petition for Rehearing were mailed to Sumner J. Hatch,
Attorney for Defendant, 72 East 400 South, Suite 330, Salt Lake
City,

Utah 84111, this

of November, 1985.
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ADDENDUM C

USTRcCT 10:; ::o

The mere fact that a

)-

in

possessir•

of recentlv stolen propertv is not sufficient to justifv a
viction of theft.

There

of

tending of themselves to establish guilt

However, such

L

;ioc'.1

1

need not be established bv additional evidence or
you find that the possession

under circumstances

warrants a finding of guilty.

In this connection vou mav

•Ill ••

···"'··1·
COC·

sider the defendant's conduct, anv false or contradictorv
ments, and any other statements the defendan: mav have made i
reference to the propertv.

If the defendant gives a false a::

of ho'.·I he acaui:ced possession of stolen propertv this is a c1:
stance that mav tend to show guilt.
In the absence of

evidence as to why the defendant

possession of recentl:: stolen oropertv. ·:ou mav infer that c·•I
defendant stole the propertv

